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"A Million Dollars and an Apology": Prostitution 
and Public Benefits Claims 
. * Margaret A. Baldwln 
I stole my title from Jennifer Greenberg, the tireless, inspiring director 
of the Florida Battered Women's Clemency Project. The Clemency Project 
represents Florida women who have been convicted of killing their abusers, 
and who are seeking executive clemency. The context was as follows. 
Jenny and I were discussing her concerns about one of the Project's clients. 
The woman had been tortured, raped and battered for years by the man she 
ultimately killed. The police had ignored her emergency calls until the day 
she was arrested. She was then prosecuted relentlessly for a crime for 
which she should not have been charged. The good news was that the 
Clemency Board seemed favorably inclined toward the woman's petition, 
and the Project staff was preparing for her release. The bad news was that 
some state officials were questioning the Project's plans for her "aftercare": 
the living, employment and support arrangements she would have available 
to her after her release from prison. 
Jenny was also deeply concerned about the woman's future in a world 
that had abandoned her so many times in the past. Troubling, though, was 
the seemingly punitive attitude of the state officials in raising these 
concerns. As if the fact that the woman had no one to turn to, and nothing 
to rely on should count as another strike against her. As if the state had not 
played a key role in destroying her life. As if the state could not, 
conceivably, owe something to her. "Aftercare?" Jenny asked. "A million 
dollars and an apology, now that would be aftercare." I agree. That is 
what "economic justice" for Jenny's client would, to my mind, consist of: 
generous, respectful provision of the material and moral conditions 
necessary to exercise self-determination, to forge a self-regarding identity, 
to enjoy belonging among and being cared for by others. To my mind, 
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to 
thank Murdina Campbell, April Cherry, Beth Gamrnie, Jennifer Greenberg, Deborah Hart, 
Gabriele Plendl, Greg Thompson and Ruth Witherspoon for their insights, experience and 
friendship. Christina Rexroat provided able research assistance. A research grant from 
Florida State University College of Law supported the production of this paper. 
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economic justice for prostituted women-from whom so much has been 
taken for so long-would look the same. 
That is the vision of economic justice informing this paper, and it is a 
big order. It is hard, these days, to imagine economic justice-for 
anyone-in any terms but the most withered and capitulated. The gap 
between rich and poor widens yearly, with job growth in this country 
largely confined to the "junk job" sector. I As many as thirty percent of 
American workers are "contingent workers": disposable, part-time and 
temporary.2 Forty-one million Americans now lack health insurance. 3 Our 
entire social welfare system, especially programs benefiting women and 
children, is under attack. 4 State health, education and training support 
functions are increasingly relegated to the nationally booming prison 
system. 5 With socialism fatally stigmatized, we little dare to even imagine 
ideals of economic justice-much less demand concrete legal or legislative 
progress toward those goals. The economic situation of women generally, 
or of prostituted women in particular, in these new times is hardly 
mentioned. But I want to swim against that tide, and offer here specific 
proposals promoting access to public benefits for prostituted women. I 
posit, at the outset, that economic justice for prostituted women means, that 
at a minimum, no woman be required to participate in prostitution to meet 
any of her basic survival needs, and that it is a duty of government to 
guarantee women's freedom from prostitution in those terms. 
My analysis of the treatment of prostituted women under state benefits 
programs thus differs in significant respects from the approach advanced 
1. See, e.g., JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 
(1998). Galbraith summarizes his findings: "[s]ince 1970, the pay gap between good and 
bad jobs in America has grown. It is now so wide that it threatens, as it did in the Great 
Depression, the social stability of the country." James K. Galbraith, With Economic 
Inequality for All, THE NATION 24 (Sept. 7114, 1998). See also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN 
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (documenting the 
elimination of jobs from urban, minority communities). 
2. See Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, 
or Organize?, 22 N.YU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557,558 (1996). 
3- See ROGERS M. SMITH, THE NATION 12 (Sept. 7114, 1998). Smith, a professor of 
political science at Yale University, describes the current economic landscape, 
Id. 
Asian economies are imploding, the world's poor are expanding, more than 
a fifth of our own children are impoverished, American schools are falling 
apart, a record 41 million of us lack health insurance and the nation is 
experiencing the widest divergence of income, wealth and opportunity in 
fi ve decades. 
4. For an analysis of the current attack on welfare from a leading welfare historian, see 
GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END (1998). 
5. By 1995, the number of incarcerated persons in the United States exceeded one million. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Prison and Jail hunates, 1995 (NCJ-
161132). See generally JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA'S 
IMPRISONMENT BINGE (Brian Gore et al. eds., 1994). Irwin and Austin report that spending for 
corrections increased 59% between 1980 and 1988, while welfare spending decreased by 27%. 
Id. at 17. 
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by some prostitutes' rights organizations. They claim that prostitutes 
should receive all employment-based public benefits and legal protections 
on the same basis as other working women and men. Among these 
programs and guarantees are Social Security benefits,6 worker's 
compensation protections,7 Fair Labor Standards Act regulations,8 sexual 
harassment remedies under Title vn9 and collective bargaining rights. 10 In 
addition, prostitution rights advocates have asserted that these guarantees 
must be extended to prostitutes' families, including repeal of anti-pimping 
laws. I I These proposals are typically advanced through an assimilationist 
argument. On this argument, prostitution should be treated like any other 
kind of gainful work, and relationships prostituted women have with men 
and their own children should be treated the same as any other family in the 
employment benefits system. 12 However, these demands are usually 
strongly linked with arguments for the decriminalization of all forms of 
prostitution-for all involved or who benefit from the practice. Indeed, the 
argument for decriminalization often quickly overshadows any other 
concrete proposals for benefits entitlements made on women's behalf. 
I strongly agree that prostituted women should be entitled to the 
substantial benefit structure attaching to paid employment and to maternity 
in this country. I am especially sympathetic to the effort to re-categorize 
prostitution as "work," and to legally acknowledge prostituted women. 
However, I do not endorse a "prostitution as work" strategy as a route to 
economic justice for prostituted women. There are two fundamental 
reasons for my reluctance, one pragmatic and the other substantive. Both 
reasons also inform the position I do take on the future and necessity of 
public benefits programs for women in prostitution. 
The pragmatic concern is based on the real-life observation that, 
6. See, e.g., Tracy M. Clements, Prostitution and the American Health Care System: 
Denying Access to a Group of Women in Need, BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 48, 68-83 (1996) 
(analyzing availability of Social Security disability benefits and Medicaid to prostituted 
women). 
7. See, e.g., Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights in Sex Work: The Struggle for 
Dancers' Rights as Employees, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 521 (1996) (analyzing status of nude dancers 
as "employees" under worker's compensation protections, and wages and hour regulations). 
8. See id. (evaluating FLSA eligibility status of women working as dancers in strip clubs). 
See also cases cited infra at note 93 and accompanying text. 
9. See Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant 
for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 163 (1997) (liability of 
employers for sexual harassment of women employees required to wear sexually provocative 
uniforms at work). 
10. See Siobhan Brooks, Dancing Toward Freedom, in WHORES AND OrHER FEMINISTS 252 
(Jill Nagle ed., 1997) [hereinafter WHORES AND OrHERFEMINISTS] (describing events leading up 
to organization of dancers at the Lusty Lady in San Francisco). 
11. See Draft Statement from the 2nd World Whores' Congress (1986), reprinted in SEX 
WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 307, 319-20 (Frederique Delacoste & 
Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987). 
12. See id. 
192 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10: 1 
twenty-five years after the effective legalization of stripping, live sex 
performance and pornography, only a handful of job-based reforms of 
women's working conditions in the sex industry have actually been 
achieved. 13 Working conditions in strip clubs have, in the past ten years, 
apparently worsened for most women. 14 We need to examine why this is 
true. Of course, labor organizing and effective employee advocacy are 
always difficult struggles. In addition, municipal and state neglect of 
women's complaints regarding wages and working conditions against strip 
clubs and live sex venues dampens the confidence of women who 
complain, reinforcing the illusion of omnipotence that club operators too 
often enjoy and use to exploit dancers. 15 
Ultimately, an explanation for this lack of real change must also be 
found in the conditions under which women are recruited, used and 
retained in the sex industry. The experience and effects of prostitution, 
stripping and other public sex performance drastically undermine women's 
efforts at self-protection, collective empowerment and economic mobility. 
These conditions include serial sexual abuse, beatings, humiliation, drug 
and alcohol use, grinding despair and depression linked to repeated sexual 
exploitation. 16 A recent study conducted in Minneapolis/St. Paul by Ruth 
13. To my knowledge, in the United States, there has been only one successful 
unionization campaign, among dancers in a strip club. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 255. 
Other initiatives have been limited to intermittent wages and hour challenges by the U.S. 
Labor Department. See infra note 93. 
14. For an informative description of these changes, see Lisa E. Sanchez, Boundaries of 
Legitimacy: Sex, Violence, Citizenship, and Community in a Local Sexual Economy, 22 L. 
& Soc. INQUIRY 543,557 (1998). Sanchez reports: 
Since the expansion of the strip industry, dancers complain of having less 
control over their situation and the kinds of performances required to make 
the money they need. For example, when topless dance clubs went 'fully 
nude,' dancers reported having to 'do more' to get tips.... Because 
customers can see the exterior of a woman's body from any seat in the club, 
they no longer pay women to give 'peek shows' or to remove additional 
articles of clothing. Rather, they pay for increased proximity, for close-up 
views of the more interior portions of a woman's body, and for touch. 
Additionally, in the new regime of club dancing, dancers are being pressured 
or required by management to do booth or lap dances .... 
And while the degree of physical contact between dancers and customers 
continues to escalate, the pay scale has progressively eroded. Dancers have 
gone from making a living wage plus tips in the late 1980's to making no 
wage at all in 1996-0nly tips in most clubs. . .. It is not only women in 
prostitution who have been raped, beaten, or murdered .... During the fIrst 
summer that I conducted research in the city, the body of a woman who had 
left a shift at a strip club where she had worked for only six days was found 
burning in a metal dumpster near the club. 
Id. at 557-58. 
15. See Speech by Johanna Breyer, Exotic Dancers Alliance, delivered at the Hastings 
Women's Law Journal Symposium, Economic Justice for Sex Workers (on file with the 
Hastings Women's Law Journal). 
16. For a review of research studies documenting the incidence of sexual and physical 
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Parriott substantiates many earlier findings documenting the traumatic 
psychological and health effects of prostitution. Almost all of the women 
in the Parriott study categorize themselves as chemically addicted-most 
frequently to alcohol and crack cocaine. 17 They report high rates of 
exposure to sexually transmitted disease and resultant pelvic inflammatory 
disease. 18 One-half had been physically assaulted by johns and two-thirds 
had been raped by them, often with extreme violence. Ninety percent had 
also suffered high levels of violence from others, with over half being 
beaten at least once a month. 19 Sixty-two percent report a sexual assault 
prior to being prostituted, over half by a family member. 20 
Long-term traumatic effects are normal among prostituted women. 
Stress-related effects include sleep disorders, flashbacks, depression, 
suicide attempts and self-mutilating behaviors.21 The growing literature 
documenting the impact of domestic and sexual violence on health and 
employment corroborates the trauma findings specific to prostitution. 
Recent research documents that domestic violence alone 
may be the number one drain on the domestic economy through 
direct medical costs, disability, long-term welfare dependence, 
child neglect, homelessness, depression and other mental illnesses, 
chemical dependence, criminal behavior by battered women and 
their children, truancy, and loss of employment and productivity 
among women in the workforce. 22 
violence, terrorism and murder against prostituted women and girls, see Margaret A. 
Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 7 YALE J. 
L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992). 
17. Half the women reported that they were high "all the time" while soliciting and turning 
tricks; 34% described themselves as high at least half the time. 96% had used crack cocaine, 
71 % within the previous 6 months. 78% percent began using crack while involved in 
prostitution. Ruth Parriott, Health Experience of Twin Cities Women Used in Prostitution: 
Survey Findings and Recommendations 15 (1994) (unpublished study on file with author). 
18. 85% of the women in the Parriott study had contracted at least one of the SID's most 
injurious to health: chlamydia, syphilis, gonorrhea, genital warts and genital herpes. Four STD 
episodes was the average number experienced, most commonly chlamydia and gonorrhea. 31 % 
reported at least one episode of pelvic inflammatory disease. Id. at 13. 
19. Id. at 19. 
20. Id. at 18-19. 
21. /d. at 17. The level of stress responses, Parriott found, "did not significant! y vary across 
types of prostitution, levels of exposure to prostitution, or age of initiation," id. at 17, but did 
significantly increase among women who had experienced sexual violence prior to being 
prostituted. Id. These PTSD findings are consistent with research conducted among 130 
prostituted women in San Francisco by Dr. Melissa Farley. See Melissa Farley & Howard 
Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 27(3) WOMEN & HEALTH 37 
(1998). Parriott's subjects further reported suicide attempts at a rate of 46%, with 65% of those 
who reported at least one attempt reporting multiple attempts. 19% reported self-mutilating 
behaviors, such as cutting. Parriott, supra note 17, at 17. 
22. Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health Care: 
A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 153, 207 (Spring 1995), citing AM. MED. ASS'N, The Billion Dollar 
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The combined data on domestic and sexual abuse shows that: 
Over the course of protracted sexual and physical abuse, long-term 
physiological problems often emerge. Somatic complaints are 
common among battered women as a result of living in a state of 
fear. Chronic pain, agitation, insomnia and stress are common. A 
battered woman seeking medical care for an injury is more likely 
than a nonbattered woman to exhibit signs of depression, anxiety, 
family, marital, and sexual problems, and vague medical 
complaints.23 
Finally, Dr. Melissa Farley's recent research on prostituted women 
reveals that two-thirds of the women interviewed suffered post-traumatic 
stress disorder at severity levels more intense than Vietnam veterans 
seeking treatment for the condition. 24 To the extent that assimilationist, 
"prostitution as work" and family advocacy strategies flatten, normalize or 
marginalize these conditions, they fail both the women they claim to serve 
and the cause they promote. 
My second area of disagreement with the "prostitution as work" 
position is frankly substantive and normative. I fundamentally reject the 
basic claim that prostitution is a job. What, after all, does it mean to label 
an activity a "job," or a relationship system a "family?" I think what we 
mean when we call an activity a "job," or a group of relationships a 
"family," is that they further human needs for work and love that even 
those of us who often argue with Sigmund Freud's work can affirm as 
basic. The work at a job and the love of a family are the ways we seek to 
meet our individual needs for defining an identity-for achieving a sense of 
belonging and for the material means to express these drives. Prostitution 
offers none of the productive or emotional rewards represented by 
meaningful work and accompanying supportive emotional community. 
Instead, prostitution damages the integrity of women's identities,25 impedes 
women's capacities for emotional and sexual intimacy26 and forces women 
to take on an identity they reject internally. 27 
Epidemic, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6,1992. 
23. Id. at 209, citing Sandra K. Burge, Violence Against Women as a Health Care Issue, 21 
F AM. MED. 368, 373 (1989); Public Hearing before the Commission on Sex Discrimination in 
the Statutes, Sex Discrimination in the Health Field and in the Delivery of Health Care 174 
(1994) (testimony of Barbara Price, Executive Director of the N.J. Coalition for Battered 
Women). 
24. See Farley & Barkan, supra note 21, at 45. 
25. See id. 
26. In Ruth Parriot's study, for example, "three-fourths of the women mentioned difficulty 
establishing an intimate relationship outside prostitution, due to the inability to separate the fear, 
disgust, and emotionally-distanced attitude developed in prostitution from the dynamics of a 
loving relationship." Parriot, supra note 17, at 4. 
27. Thus, the Farley & Barkan study found that 88% of the women said they wanted to get 
out of prostitution, 78% said they wanted a home or safe place and 73% said they wanted job 
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In these real terms, prostitution is not a job-and it is a mistake to 
advocate for prostituted womens' interests on the cruel fiction that it is. 
Instead, public benefits programs should be scrutinized for how their 
exclusion of prostituted women from coverage prevents women from 
participating in work they value, loving relationships and a self-regarding 
life. 
Moreover, these needs are not only personal and psychological, but 
define public and social obligations as well. Consequently, as a right of 
citizenship, social equality and individual dignity, a program of economic 
justice must afford the means for women to meet those needs-and not 
only with money, but accompanied by recognition, friendship and authentic 
concern for women's well-being. Speaking of the needs of trauma 
survivors for commonality with others, Judith Herman guides us toward 
these kinds of reconnections between survivors and community that should 
shape our policies: 
Commonality with other people carries with it all the meanings of 
the word common. It means belonging to a society, having a public 
role, being part of that which is universal. It means having a 
feeling of familiarity, of being known, of communion. It means 
taking part in the customary, the commonplace, the ordinary, and 
the everyday. It also carries with it a feeling of smallness, of 
insignificance, a sense that one's own troubles are 'as a drop in the 
sea.' The survivor who has achieved commonality with others can 
rest from her labors. Her recovery is accomplished; all that 
remains before her is her life.28 
The remainder of this Article explores how well two important public 
benefits programs perform these obligations. The two programs I address 
are the state workers' compensation systems and the federal Social Security 
disability program. 29 Both programs define eligibility for benefits in 
tnllmng. See Farley & Barkan, supra note 21, at 44. These women were not identifying 
prostitution as a job, as a way to have good relationships or as an identity they embraced for 
themselves. Even activists with a prostitutes' rights perspective acknowledge this but prefer to 
explain women's resistance to identifying as prostitutes or sex workers as a response to the 
stigmatized status of sex work, rather than as a form of resistance to the sex work itself. For 
example, Samantha, co-Director of COYOTE in San Francisco, describes the difficulties she 
has encountered in sustaining a support group for sex workers: "[I] think its more accurate to 
talk about a community of sex workers than a 'movement.' A movement has to be public and 
most prostitutes aren't interested in that. They don't see what they're doing as an identity; it's 
just a temporary job." WENDY CHAPKIS, LIVE SEX ACTS: WOMEN PERFORMING EROTIC LABOR 
206--07 (1997). 
28. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 235-36 (1997). 
29. Issues relating to government enforcement of minimum wage, overtime, and working 
conditions regulations, the exercise of collective bargaining rights, the redressability of sexual 
harassment, racial harassment and other equal rights claims are beyond the scope of this paper. 
For analysis of these legal protections in the context of prostitution and stripping, see sources 
cited supra, notes 6-10. 
w 
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relation to the claimant's working life, but from rather different 
perspectives. The workers' compensation system affords compensation for 
work-related injuries or disease; the social security disability program 
affords benefits for persons whose long-term or serious impairments 
prevent them from working. I examine how adequately each program 
addresses the survival and recovery needs of women in the sex industry. I 
especially interrogate how the legal template of each program's definitions 
of work and disability affect prostituted women's claims. Along the way, I 
will address the importance of the criminal status of prostitution in 
determining benefit eligibility under each plan. Again, it is not my aim to 
rationalize prostitution as work through this analysis, or to argue for the 
decriminalization of prostitution. My aim is to secure the best possible 
recovery benefits for prostituted women. 
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION W AGE-REPLACEMENT PROGRAMS. 
Patrice Hanson worked as an "exotic dancer" at the Hide-Out Saloon in 
the state of Idaho. As she was leaving work one night after her shift, she 
was shot and killed in the parking lot of the bar. Her husband and child, 
Harold and Jesse Hanson, brought a Workmen's Compensation claim for 
survivor's benefits available under the Idaho workers' compensation 
statute. 30 Work-related killings of the kind suffered by Patrice Hanson are 
tragically common among women involved in prostitution and sexual 
performance,31 as are the sexual assaults, batteries, drug and alcohol-related 
fatalities and suicides already sadly catalogued.32 All of these kinds of 
injuries have been held within the scope of workers' compensation benefits 
programs. 33 Other injuries commonly suffered by women in the sex 
industry, which are often compensable under state workers' compensation 
systems, are disabilities resulting from emotional stress34 and job-related 
30. See Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444 (Idaho 1988). 
31. For sources on the murder rate among prostituted women, see Baldwin, supra note 16, at 
88. See also KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 44--48 (1995). 
32. See sources cited supra notes 16-26, and accompanying text. 
33. For cases involving sexual assault, see Eliot 1. Katz, Annotation, Workers' 
Compensation: Sexual Assaults as Compensable, 52 A.L.R. 4th 731 (1987 & Supp. 1997); for 
suicides, see Rodney R. Nordstrom, Suicide as a Compensable Injury Under Workers' 
Compensation Statutes: A Review of Judicial Decisions, 16 EMP. REL. L. 1. 37 (1990); for 
physical assaults, see 1 ARTHUR LARSON & lEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW § 11.00 (1998) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON]; for alcohol fatalities, see 
2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995); Panagos v. Industrial Commission, 524 
N.E.2d 1018 (TIl. App. 1988). 
34. See Aya Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims Under California's 
Workers' Compensation System, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1327 (1994). A mental strain case, with 
interesting implications for claims brought by women in prostitution or stripping, is Mapp. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 317 A.2d 680 (Pa. Cornrow. 1974). In Mapp, the court held that benefits 
should be paid to a female undercover police officer, for disability resulting from excessive 
strain experienced while posing as a prostitute for five months. This holding should be helpful 
precedent for women actually used in prostitution and stripping, not only posing as such, for 
periods of time much longer than five months. 
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physical injuries. 35 Benefits available for compensable injuries typically 
include cash payments, medical care to the worker injured on the job, and 
cash payments for dependent survivors, like Patrice Hanson's family. 36 
What legal hurdles face sex industry claimants, such as Patrice 
Hanson's family, in seeking compensation for these injuries? Two basic 
issues affecting recovery pose special complications for claims brought by 
sex industry survivors. The first is the requirement that the injury be 
causally linked to, and arise in the course of, the worker's employment.37 
The second is the question of who qualifies as an eligible "employee" 
under the applicable statute?8 Since workers' compensation programs are 
intended fundamentally to provide a substitute for wages a worker has lost 
from a work-related injury or condition, each of these eligibility criteria is 
aimed at segregating work-related from personal occurrences, and at 
identifying the person or entity primarily responsible for workplace harms. 
For women in prostitution, application of these tests is deeply 
problematic. Participation in the sex industry has the effect of collapsing 
boundaries between work and life, and blurs issues of power and 
responsibility-the very distinctions that these tests are designed to 
sharpen. The boundary-blurring of work and life takes place on several 
levels. Prostitution and stripping exhaust, disorient and depress women; 
the self-medication women do with drugs and alcohol intensify these 
effects. The daily control exercised over women to keep them enmeshed in 
making money with sex work leads to the erosion of other relationships and 
thwarts personal autonomy. 39 As a result, women tend to participate in 
fewer and fewer other life activities-like battered women often do, 
35. A case raising such factual issues, but which was ultimately tried in tort, was Doney v. 
Tambouratgis, 587 P.2d 1160, 1161-65 (Cal. 1979) (club owner liable for $3,945 
compensatory, $12,500 punitive damages for personal injury sustained by dancer from beating 
by club owner; no bar by virtue of workers' compensation coverage since employer did not 
plead workers' compensation protections). 
36. Since these are state programs, there are local variations in scope of coverage and 
benefits. For a state-by-state survey of available benefits, see 10 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 
33, at app. B. 
37. See infra notes 42-71 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra notes 73-113 and accompanying text. 
39. Pimping is done this way; club owners also use scheduling patterns to control 
virtually all of a woman's waking hours. Carrie Benson Fischer recounts an example of this 
practice explained to her by Kelly Holsopple, an advocate for women in stripping and 
prostitution: 
Clubs often structure dancers' hours in a way that uniquely burdens their 
lives. Holsopple explained that clubs often schedule a dancer to work with 
several hours off between her working shifts; for example, she might be 
scheduled to perform between two and four 0' clock, and then again from six 
0' clock until midnight. Rather than leave the club premises during the 
interim, the dancer will most likely remain there and perhaps mingle with 
the customers. In this manner the club is able to book longer periods of 
dancers time without having to compensate them for doing so. 
Benson Fischer, supra note 7, at 75 and accompanying text (citations omitted). 
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retreating to sleep and self-protective isolation. 40 Prostitution and stripping 
also require women to create an illusion of personal interest in the 
customer, a dynamic that in and of itself hedges the difference between 
work and personal life. 41 So too, are power and control arrangements 
among women, customers and club owners obscured. Consequently, as the 
following discussion examines, prostituted women may find themselves 
both over and underdetermined as eligible claimants on these tests. 
A. "Arising out of' a "course of employment." 
The "course of employment" requirement ordinarily demands proof of 
two elements. First, a claimant must prove that the injury or condition 
arose out of the course of employment and second, that it was incurred in 
the course of employment. As applied, the "arising out of' test usually 
requires a showing of a causal connection between the risk of injury and 
the employment.42 The "in the course of employment" test asks whether 
the injury was inflicted while and where the employee was performing job 
tasks or related activities.43 
In Hanson, Patrice Hanson was killed on the property of the bar, 
apparently by a customer or a stranger. The employer did not contest that 
the death was employment-related. Nor should claimants typically 
encounter difficulty proving the requisite link between prostitution-related 
injuries and the employment setting. The sexual assaults, emotional and 
psychological injuries, beatings, and alcohol and drug-related injuries that 
prostituted women commonly experience are demonstrably coextensive 
with the requirements, conditions and risks of working in clubs and 
practicing prostitution. Therefore, the "arising out of' causal element 
should be relatively simple to establish. 
Moreover, the "course of employment" standard should also be 
40. "My knees, back, and feet hurt. I had to sleep most of the time I wasn't working or 
working out." Stacy Reed, All Stripped Off, in WHORES AND OrHER FEMINISTS, supra note 10, 
at 179, 187. "You're sleeping half of the day and then going to work at night. You're just a 
complete vampire." Benson Fischer, supra note 7, at 75 (citing interview with former dancer 
named Kaylee, on Dateline: The Naked Truth? (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 28, 1995)). 
41. For an extended and thoughtful exploration of this process as the core sexual demand 
made on women in prostitution, see BARRY, supra note 31, at 28-36. Barry describes the 
collapse of the self-performance distinction demanded by customers: 
In prostitution, what men expect from women is the semblance of emotional, 
sexual involvement, the appearance of pleasure and consent, a semblance 
that they can treat as if it is real in the moment of the commodity exchange. 
In this sense, they want prostitutes to behave like non-prostitutes-wives, 
lovers, and girlfriends. 
Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). 
42. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 6.00 (summarizing leading judicial 
interpretations of "arising out of' requirement; causal link issue the core question). 
43. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 14.00 ("An injury is said to arise in the course 
of the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where 
the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in 
doing something incidental thereto."). 
", __ ! trit 
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analyzed in terms of the pervasive and continuous control to which women 
are subjected by clubs, brothels and pimps, both on and off the job, to 
ensure that the women keep working and keep coming back. 44 In addition, 
the ad hoc customer-defined expectations of women in actual prostitution 
and stripping transactions should expand the definition of her "course of 
employment" to the limit of his potential. 45 For example, an increasing 
number of women in stripping acknowledge the pressure they continuously 
experience, from both pimps and club owners, to prostitute in connection 
with their activities as dancers.46 Women injured in those transactions 
should assert that the prostitution transactions occurred in the course of 
club employment. 47 In short, to the extent that a woman's involvement in 
the sex industry gradually consumes her whole life, as is not uncommon, 
all of the injuries and effects of that process should conceptually satisfy this 
job-relatedness standard. 
44. For example, the women at the legal Mustang Ranch brothel in Nevada worked under 
conditions of nearly total surveillance: "A work day was 14 to 16 hours, with 3 weeks on 
and one off. The women weren't allowed out unless they could hustle a customer who 
wanted to take them into Reno. Occasionally, they received permission to leave for 2 hours 
of shopping." BARRY, supra note 31, at 232. 
45. For a very insightful discussion of how such ambiguity is exploited by johns and clubs as 
"a procurement technique and a justification for violence," see Sanchez, supra note 14, at 263-
68. 
46. For a description of current strip club practices consistent with this view, see Sanchez, 
supra note 14, at 562-63, 566-68. 
47. The reasoning, if not the result, of a claim brought by a procurer/pimp, supports my 
analysis here. The claimant worked as a bell man at a hotel and "made arrangements" for 
women to prostitute in the hotel. Jackson v. Dudley, 461 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1969). The 
claimant rented rooms for the women, procured johns and took a cut of the women's money. 
Id. at 937. On the night the bell captain sustained his injury, one of the bellboys told him to 
check on one of the women, "because she was out of order." Id. The bell captain went to 
the room where the woman was assigned to turn tricks. He found her intoxicated and in "no 
shape to send anybody up." Id. She asked for more liquor, which he refused. As he was 
leaving the room, she took out a gun she had in her purse and shot him twice. Id. 
Despite the bell captain's contention that his job duties included investigating any 
disturbances in the hotel, the court disallowed benefits on the ground that his injuries did not 
arise out his duties in connection with his work as a bell captain. Instead, "[iJt may be logically 
deducted from the evidence that at the time of the accident claimant was attempting to sober up 
one of the girls working for him so she could continue to ply her trade and earn money for both 
the claimant and herself." Id. However, the court's reasoning suggests that had a closer link 
been established between the claimant's duties to the hotel and his pimping, the result might 
have been in his favor. Id. Unlike the case of the bell man/pimp, an indisputably close nexus 
exists between a woman's employment as a stripper and an act of prostitution with a customer. 
Cf Upchurch v. Indus. Comm, 703 P.2d 628 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing claim by injured 
truck driver who apparently was injured in the course of a prostitution encounter while on the 
road). 
This theory still leaves prostituted women who do not work in strip clubs without 
recourse because the underlying employment contract may be held to be illegal. See notes 75-
86 infra and accompanying text. Further, even for an injured woman who is employed legally 
as a stripper, the success of her claim still depends on a court holding that she enjoyed employee 
status at the club, which the discussion at notes 87-114 infra and accompanying text suggests, is 
far from certain. 
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Two judicial decisions, both involving alcohol-related traffic fatalities, 
are consistent with the view offered here regarding the appropriate scope of 
the "course of employment" rule in the context of sex work. Both cases 
held that the claimants, one a dancer in a strip club and the other a belly 
dancer in a supper club, had consumed intoxicants in the course of their 
employment, and that the ultimate injuries were caused by those working 
conditions.48 
In 2800 Corporation v. Fernandez,49 Jacqueline Fernandez sought 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained in a car crash that 
occurred an hour after she left work at the Bottoms Up Lounge in Council 
Bluffs, Iowa.5o The driver of the car was a co-worker named April.51 Their 
duties at the club included dancing and interacting with the male customers 
when not dancing. In addition, a significant job requirement for the 
dancers was to get the customers to buy them at least two drinks per hour. 
Dancers ordinarily consumed over six to eight alcoholic drinks during a 
six-hour shift from 8:00 p.m. to 2:00 in the morning. Dancers had to be 
seriously intoxicated before they would be reprimanded for excessive 
drinking. 52 Based on these practices, the state industrial commission found 
that the "consumption of alcohol by dancers was condoned if not 
encouraged by lounge management. ,,53 
The Friday night before the accident, Ms. Fernandez and her friends 
injected crank, or methamphetamine, most of the night after drinking at 
work. During the day on Saturday, she and another dancer consumed part 
of a twelve-pack of beer and reported late to the club. Ms. Fernandez got 
very drunk at work until she could barely walk. At closing time, the 
manager then told both her and April that they were drunk and thus ordered 
them to leave the club.54 Ms. Fernandez got into April's car, and less than 
an hour later and a few miles from the club, April smashed the car into a 
retaining wall. April died as a result of the crash. Medical experts 
confirmed that April was drunk at the time of the accident. 55 
The employer argued, unsuccessfully, that Ms. Fernandez' injuries 
were not compensable because her drinking and drug use before work, 
rather than her drinking at work, caused her intoxication. The employer 
asserted that the use of illegal substances by the dancers was neither known 
about nor condoned by the employer. 56 The agency and the state Supreme 
Court rejected both assertions, noting that, first, the employer required the 
48. See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text. 
49. 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995). 
50. Id. at 126. 
51. !d. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 127. 
54. !d. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 128. 
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dancers to hustle drinks from customers, and second, because of this 
requirement, the employer should consequently expect that this would 
result in the dancers becoming intoxicated. 57 Further, the court identified 
two aspects of drink hustling that directly benefited the employer: profit 
from the sale of drinks and the customer appeal of the atmosphere created 
by this type of interaction with the women. 58 Since Ms. Fernandez' 
intoxication was attributable to her work, and her intoxication impaired her 
judgment, which resulted in her entering the car of another intoxicated 
individual, the court affirmed the commission's conclusion that Ms. 
Fernandez' injuries arose in the course of her employment. 59 
The court also considered the employer's argument based on the usual 
rule barring claims for injuries occurring off the employer's premises while 
the employee is on her way to or from work. The employor argued that 
this rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, should preclude the claim 
here. 60 While acknowledging the general rule, the court held that the "zone 
of danger" exception properly applied in this case. The "zone of danger" 
exception effectively extends the legal dimensions of the employer's 
premises to reach any injury "which occurred at a point where the 
employee was within the range of dangers associated with the 
employment.,,61 As in this case, "[w]hen an employer encourages or 
condones excessive drinking ... the employer ought to be held responsible 
for foreseeable injuries suffered by the employee because of the resulting 
intoxication. ,,62 
In an analogous case, an Illinois appellate court reached a similar 
conclusion. In Panagos v. Industrial Commission,63 claimant Jasmin 
Durson asserted a claim for total permanent disability for injuries she 
sustained in a car accident that occurred on the way home from her work as 
a nightclub belly dancer. 64 Ms. Durson was employed to dance two-twenty 
minute shows, spaced within a four-hour shift, from 10:00 p.m. until 2:00 
in the morning. In between performances, she was expected to socialize 
with the employer's customers. Dancers were not prohibited from drinking 
during these periods. In fact, Ms. Durson testified that she was encouraged 
to drink by the employer, although the employer denied this. In any event, 
there was no dispute that the profit made from the drinks went exclusively 
to the employer. 65 
57. Id. 
58. /d. 
59. Id. at 129. 
60. Id. 
61. /d., quoting LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP., THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 
15.00 (1986). The same rule now appears at 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 15.00. 
62. Femandez, 528 N.W.2d at 130. 
63. 524 N.E.2d 1018 (TIl. App. 1988). 
64. /d. at 1019 
65. Id. 
1m er 
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Ms. Durson testified that the employer directed her interactions with 
customers all evening on the night she was injured-introducing her to one 
table of customers early in the evening, excusing her from her second 
performance, asking her to sit with several other tables on his instruction 
and instructing her to sit with the first group to end the evening. She also 
testified that, as she was getting into her car after her shift at 4:00 a.m., the 
employer asked her if she needed a ride home. Again, the employer denied 
directing her contact with customers or offering her a ride. 66 
The appellate court affirmed the industrial commission's conclusion 
that Ms. Dursun was injured in the course of her employment on two 
grounds. The court found that "the claimant had been drinking liquor prior 
to the accident with the tacit approval of her employer," and in addition, 
"her incidental act of personal comfort (drinking liquor) was not 
unexpected and resulted in a reasonably foreseeable end result 
(drunkenness and an auto accident) that occurred within an hour after her 
leaving work.,,67 
The common-sense acknowledgment by these courts that drinking is a 
job requirement for women in strip clubs-affecting women's lives inside 
and outside the club-has potentially radical ramifications for women's 
benefit eligibility. On the same reasoning that drinking is mandatory, 
courts should also find that rape, battery and chronic post-traumatic stress 
disorder are risks inevitably borne by women engaged in commercial sex. 
All of these harms and conditions should be compensable injuries for 
workers' compensation purposes. Moreover, to the extent that a woman's 
involvement in prostitution is facilitated or coerced by boyfriends/pimps, 
injuries inflicted by them should be held within the "zone of danger" 
created by the woman's employment. However, claimants need to be 
aware that the success of such claims turns on a court's determination that a 
woman's employment life is seeping into her personal life and not vice 
versa. In the context of a prostituted woman's life, the choice may be 
essentially unstable. A court could instead readily reverse the conceptual 
paradigm, finding a woman's private life overtaking her employment life 
and use this as a basis for denying her claim. 
A court could frame this analysis under the "personal risk" principle, 
which excludes from the course of employment those injuries and risks 
"personal to the claimant.,,68 The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on the 
personal risk principle in denying a compensation claim brought by a 
dancer, Debra Morris, who sustained a paralyzing gunshot wound to the 
neck inflicted by a co-employee, Linda Hill. 69 Both women were dancers 
at Bruce's Cocktail Lounge. Hill shot Morris in the neck as Morris was 
66. [d. at 1019-20. 
67. /d. at 1021. 
68. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 12.00. 
69. See Morris v. Soloway, 428 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. App. 1988). 
&&9 
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walking out of the ladies room. Morris testified that the dispute began with 
an argument over a dance costume. Since the employer did not provide 
costumes or make allowances to purchase them, the dispute was held to be 
purely personal and consequently non-compensable under the states 
workers' compensation scheme. 70 
This case demonstrates the recovery problems that can arise for 
claimants when a court takes a view of the merger of work and life contrary 
to that espoused by the Fernandez court. The Fernandez court viewed the 
events of the claimant's day as "all work.'.?} In contrast, the Morris court 
framed the claimant's day, even in the club in an encounter with a co-
employee regarding work attire, as involving wholly personal and private 
matters.72 Whether or not the specific holding in Morris was correct, the 
important point is that application of a legal standard that turns on a 
work/life dichotomy is bound to be arbitrary as applied to women's lives-
especially where that difference has little practical meaning. 
B. "Employee" status. 
Another significant limitation on women's recovery prospects under 
the workers' compensation laws is the requirement that the claimant be an 
"employee" within the meaning of the applicable state law. There are two 
common restrictions on the definition of "employee" that most concern 
potential claimants injured in the course of prostitution and other sex work. 
The first restriction is the limitation of employee status to those with legal 
contracts of employment. This restriction bars recovery at the outset for 
injuries arising from illegal prostitution transactions, at least for the woman 
involved. 73 The second restriction is the exclusion of so-called 
"independent contractors" from recovery under workers' compensation 
statutes. Strip club owners, who routinely assert that the dancers who work 
at their clubs are (ineligible) independent contractors rather than (eligible) 
employees, have most often exploited this limitation.74 These requirements 
are based on important judgments about relative responsibility and control 
exercised among people involved in the sex industry. As I suggested 
earlier, the relevant doctrine does little to clarify or evaluate appropriately. 
70. Id. at 44. This is a strange story, at least to me. I have never heard of a dispute over a 
dance costume escalating to violence, much less an ambush-style shooting. It was interesting to 
me that the court also noted that linda Hill was a "dangerous drug dealer who carried a gun." 
Id. Hill was killed before she could testify. Id. It seems to me that this shooting was likely 
drug-related, rather than about a costume. If it was drug-related, then the same reasoning relied 
upon by the court in Fernandez could yield a conclusion that drug transactions, like alcohol 
consumption, were events in the course of and arising out of the dancer's employment. 
71. 528 N.W.2d at 128. 
72. 428 N.W.2d at 44--45. 
73. See cases cited infra, at notes 75-86. 
74. See cases cited supra notes 69-72; infra notes 75-82. 
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1. Illegal Contracts of Employment 
The rule extending contracts for illegal acts from the scope of workers' 
compensation laws was crafted in response to claims brought by injured 
bootleggers and bartenders during Prohibition.75 The exclusion should 
probably be understood as a narrow one. Employee misconduct in and of 
itself, even if amounting to criminal behavior, has long been held an 
insufficient basis for denial of benefits so long as the employee was 
otherwise acting in the course of employment.76 Moreover, an employment 
contract which is illegal due to the incompetency of the claimant to enter 
into the agreement (ordinarily because the claimant is a minor) typically 
will not bar a compensation claim brought by the injured worker.77 To bar 
compensation on the grounds of illegality, it seems that the claimant must 
75. Prohibition-era bartenders: Herbold v. Neff, 193 N.Y.S. 244 (1922); Snyder v. 
Morgan, 154 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1931); Beer delivery personnel: Swihura v. Horowitz, 152 N.E. 
411 (N.Y. 1926); Pepper v. Direnzo, 46 Pa. D. & c. 118 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1943). All 
of the cases were apparently decided on the grounds of public policy, rather than by 
reference to an explicit exclusion of such employments from the definition of covered 
employees in the state workers' compensation law. In Snyder, the court affirmed the 
principle that "[i]t is only in those cases where the contract of hiring is valid that the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable. Contracts that are prohibited by express 
legislative enactments do not come within the cognizance of the Bureau." Snyder, 154 A.2d 
at 526. In Herbold, the court was less restrained: "This court cannot lend its aid to the 
enforcement of any claim growing out of a contract of employment, one of the purposes of 
which is the violation of a law of the land making the sale of intoxicating liquors a criminal 
offense." Herbold, 193 N.Y.S. at 245. The Swihura court summarily affirmed the lower 
court's denial of benefits where the lower court had found based on the claimant's own 
testimony that he was engaged in an illegal employment at the time of the accident. 
Swihura, 152 N.E. at 411. 
A modem case standing for the same principle is DePew v. State Accident Insurance 
Fund, 703 P.2d 259 (Or. App. 1985) (compensation denied to employee shot in the back while 
working at an illegal gambling club). 
76. A statement of the general principle is offered by Larson: 
Misconduct of the employee, whether negligent or wilful, is immaterial in 
compensation law, unless it takes the form of deviation from the course of 
employment, or unless it is of a kind specifically made a defense in the 
jurisdictions containing such a defense in their statutes. 
2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, §§ 30.00. For cases applying this rule, see e.g. Kochilas v. 
Industrial Commission, 654 N.E.2d 568 (TIL App. 1995) (holding that violating a law in the 
course of one's employment does not per se remove the employee from course of employment 
for workers' compensation purposes); Boryca v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 487 N.W.2d 876 
(Minn. 1992) (claimant's compensation affirmed despite the fact that he was discharged for 
wilful misconduct, including making threatening phone calls to his co-employees); Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 169 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980) (stating that an employee is not necessarily removed from the course of 
employment for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act even if that employee's conduct in 
the course of employment was illegal or criminal); Stembridge Builders, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission, 636 N.E.2d 1088 (TIl. App. 1994) (illegal conduct during a business-related errand 
that may have contributed to an accident does not remove an employee from the course of his 
employment for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act). 
77. See, e.g., Bowers v. General Guaranty Co., 430 S.W.2d 871,872 (1968) (holding that an 
employee is covered by Workers' Compensation even if the contract for employment is 
prohibited by statute, or otherwise, as long as the employees duties are legal). 
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be hired under a contract of employment that is unenforceable and be hired 
to perform acts which are of themselves violations of penal laws. 
I have found no reported cases involving a claim brought by a 
prostituted woman in her status as a prostitute,78 where her eligibility for 
benefits was challenged on the ground of the contemplated illegality of the 
underlying employment contract. However, both disqualifying conditions, 
unenforceability and substantive illegality, are met in a typical contract for 
prostitution. In addition, a court may invoke public policy grounds for 
denying a claim brought by a prostituted woman, even if the technical 
illegality of a contract for prostitution could be overlooked doctrinally. For 
example, the DePew court clearly expressed the view that worker's 
compensation laws should not be used to benefit workers whose 
occupations are "[n]ot necessary to the enrichment and economic well-
being of our citizens.,,79 Considerations of public morality may also come 
into play, based on related precedent. 
Surviving spouse claims can be denied on the ground that the spouse 
has been or is involved in a "meretricious relationship" with a third party.80 
Disqualifying meretricious relationships include engaging in prostitution. 
Other dependents may also be barred from recovery if the dependency 
involved immoral conduct. 81 As one Pennsylvania court explained, 
78. See Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 65 P.2d 
1349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937). This case involved a claim brought by Dorothy Cook, who was 
employed as an entertainer and also earned commissions for encouraging customers to buy 
drinks while she was not on stage. The court upheld her claim for compensation, despite the 
fact that the contract under which she was employed was illegal for the employer to offer. State 
law nowhere expressly criminalized an employee's acceptance of such employment, though, nor 
forbade accepting payment for performing duties under the contract. Since the prohibition was 
directed solely at the employer, the employee's compensation claim was held unaffected by the 
employer's illegal act. [d. at 1350--51. 
79. DePew, 703 P.2d at 260. In particular, the DePew court prohibited compensation to 
workers employed under contracts to perform criminal activities. [d. 
80. See Insurance Company of North America v. Jewel, 164 S.E.2d 846,847 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1968) (holding a claimant is not entitled to compensation even after she participated in a 
marriage ceremony with the employee and only later learned employee was married to someone 
else); Shultz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 621 A.2d 1239 (Pa. Commw. 1993); 
McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 603 A.2d 238 (Pa. Commw. 1992) 
(termination of widower's benefits). However, these rules appear to be eroding. See e.g., Todd 
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 692 A.2d 1086 (p.A. 1997) (termination of death 
benefits not warranted even though the employee's widow was living in a meretricious 
relationship with third party after the employee's death, where widow married third party prior 
to the employer filing a petition for termination of benefits); Campbell v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 695 A.2d 976, 979 (Pa. Commw. 1997) (alleged meretricious 
relationship between claimant and third party does not bar receipt of benefits where sexual 
relationship between employee and claimant had ceased prior to employer's petitioning for 
termination of benefits). 
81. See, e.g., Jewel, 164 S.E.2d at 847. A distinction is drawn between claims where the 
"dependency itself grew out of, or resulted from the immoral act of the claimant" and "cases 
where the support had no relation to the immorality." [d. As an example of the latter, the Jewel 
court offered the example of a daughter who is a prostitute and is dependent upon a father. "In 
such a case, where morals have nothing to do with the dependency, she would, upon his death 
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compensation laws should be construed to foster "good morals by 
encouraging legally recognized family relationships and discouraging illicit 
relationships. ,,82 These reasons, singly or in combination, could likewise 
be recited to deny claims for injuries sustained in illegal prostitution 
transactions. 
In my view, neither public morality nor criminal justice goals are 
promoted by barring compensation claims brought by prostituted women. 
After all, claimants seeking benefits are attempting to leave prostitution-
not to continue participation in the practice. Benefits payments may be the 
support a woman needs to transition to a life beyond prostitution.83 To 
deny her benefits is to participate in pimping her further. Indeed, several 
recent Pennsylvania cases narrowly construing the scope of the 
"meretriciousness" exclusion appear to acknowledge the unfair and 
punitive impact of the rule. 84 Further, denial of claims on the ground of 
contract illegality has the effect of rewarding johns, pimps, club owners 
and other people who benefit from prostitution transactions, while the 
entire burden of harmful impact is carried by the woman. Such unfair 
windfalls for employers have been recognized and addressed in the 
majority of state statutes, which bar the use of illegality defenses by 
employers who seek to resist compensation claims brought by illegally 
hired minors.85 The basic rationale for allowing compensation in those 
cases is that child labor prohibitions are intended for the protection of 
minors, and employers should not be able to compound the benefits of their 
criminal activity by asserting the illegality of the contract as a shield when 
under the conditions prescribed in the Workmen's Compensation Act, be entitled to 
compensation. Under these circumstances, her morals have nothing to do with the matter." Id. 
82. Nevius v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 416 A2d 1134, 1137 (p.A 
Commw. 1980). As the Jewel court put the point: "Nor do we adhere to the view that the 
Workmen's Compensation Act should, under the guise of liberal construction, be so construed 
as to provide a statutory reward for immoral conduct." Jewel, 164 S.E.2d at 847. 
83. The research finding by Farley and Barkan, that 88% of the prostituted women in their 
study wanted to leave prostitution, supports this conclusion. See Farley & Barkan, supra note 
21. 
84. Recent cases narrow the scope of the rule by a combination of a highly technical 
construction of the petition requirements, and a practical, need-based approach to determining 
the validity oftechnically sufficient challenges. For the technical angle, see Todd v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 692 A2d 1086 (P.A 1997) (holding that the date on which the 
employer files petition challenging widow's benefits is the date the existence of the meretricious 
relationship is determined; benefits not terminated when widow had married third party by the 
date petition was filed); Campbell v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 695 A2d 976 
(Pa. Commw. 1997) (termination of benefits unwarranted where meretricious relationship had 
ceased by the time the employer's petition was filed). For examples of substantive liberality in 
continuing payment of benefits, see Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeal Board (Sadvary), 570 A2d 84 (P.A 1990) (allowing continued receipt of benefits by 
widow living meretriciously with a man; basis for the decision was the fact that the widow was 
completely dependent on the worker's compo benefits and lived in an economically depressed 
area). Cf. Schultz, 621 A2d at 1243 (finding that termination of benefits was permissible where 
claimant had sufficient means to support herself in the relationship with the third party). 
85. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 47.52(a). 
A 
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a child is injured on the job.86 Admittedly, criminal prohibitions against 
prostitution are generally not intended for the protection of prostituted 
women. However, courts should look behind the superficial symmetry of 
status among johns, pimps and prostituted women to the actual dynamics of 
control, responsibility, and risk, operating in prostitution transactions. By 
failing to do so, the fact that prostituted women, rather than pimps or johns, 
are the people who suffer the greatest injuries in prostitution transactions, 
under conditions that they can little control, remains unaddressed. This 
only serves to further benefit pimps and johns. This grossly inequitable 
distribution of benefits and risks is the basic inequity that the workers' 
compensation laws were intended to remedy, a purpose which the "illegal 
contract" shield should not continue to thwart. 
2. Independent Contractor Status 
Many women work in positions within the sex industry that are not 
illegal, and therefore they do not confront the same "illegal contract" bar 
facing women engaged in illegal prostitution. Nevertheless, similar issues 
of power, responsibility and risk confront courts in the context of claims 
raised in legal sex venues. Most importantly, courts must determine 
whether women who dance in strip clubs or perform in other live sex 
settings should be classified as employees (who would be eligible for 
workers' compensation) or as independent contractors (who would not be 
eligible).87 
In a majority of jurisdictions, the question is decided by reference to 
the common law "right of control" test. This test asks "whether the 
employer assumes the right to control the time, manner, and method of 
executing the work of the employee as distinguished from the right merely 
to require certain definite results in conformity with their agreement. ,,88 In 
86. See, e.g., Garnhum's Case, 202 N.E.2d 255, 253 (Mass. 1964) (asserting that 
"[r]estrictions upon the freedom of contract imposed in the interests of society in general and for 
the benefit of minors in particular must be observed by those seeking to avail themselves of the 
services of those under age"; double compensation claim allowed for underage claimant who 
had lied about his age); Lopanic v. Berkeley Cooperative Gin Co., 191 So.2d 108 (Miss. 1966) 
(holding that employer bears the burden of not employing minors under the child labor laws; 
double compensation recoverable by injured minor who misrepresented his age). 
87. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02 (13)--(15) (defining employee, employer and 
employment). See generally Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers' Compensation: Detennining the 
Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 419 
(1994). 
88. Hanson v. BCB Inc., 754 P.2d 444,446 (Idaho 1988), quoting Burdick v. Thornton, 712 
P.2d 570, 572 (Idaho 1985). The Hansons had also urged the court to adopt an alternative test, 
the "nature of the work" test, Hanson 754 P.2d at 446 n.l, which has been adopted in other 
jurisdictions. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 45.10. The "nature of the work" test 
asks "( 1) whether the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the 
employer, and (2) whether the worker, relative to the particular employer, furnishes an 
independent business or professional service." Hanson 754 P.2d at 446 n.t. The Hanson court 
declined the Hansons' invitation to adopt this test, both on the ground that the "right to control" 
test had been reaffirmed in a long line of Idaho case law, and because the two tests are largely 
F 
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short, if the employer can control both the result and the method of 
performing the work, the worker is an employee. This determination is 
made by reference to four factors. The four factors are: "( 1) direct 
evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) the 
furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fIre. ,,89 
In a minority of jurisdictions, a test assessing the "nature of the work" 
is applied, either exclusively or as a default rule when the right to control 
test yields an ambiguous result. The "nature of the work" test, advocated 
as the better rule by Professor Larson, looks directly to 
the character of the claimant's work or business-how skilled it is, 
how much of a separate calling or enterprise it is, to what extent it 
rna y be expected to carry its own accident burden and so on-and 
its relation to the employer's business, that is, how much it is a 
regular part of the employer's regular work, whether it is 
continuous or intermittent, and whether the duration is suffIcient to 
amount to the hiring of continuing services as distinguished from 
contracting for the completion of a particular job.90 
While the "right to control" test examines the employment relationship 
by examining traditional agency principles, the "nature of the work" test 
evaluates the relationship from the standpoint of a major purpose of the 
workers' compensations laws-to distribute the risk of workplace accidents 
to the consumer of the product, through the entity best able to carry 
insurance for the accident. 91 
The two reported workers' compensation cases, applying the above-
discussed factors in the context of sex work, both involve women who 
worked as dancers in strip clubs.92 In both cases, the courts struggled with 
the appropriate application of the "right to control" factors in evaluating the 
relationship between the clubs and the dancers who worked there. The 
courts' uncertainty is understandable, given that the standard itself is 
designed to identify an employer/employee relationship that is remote from 
the sexual interactions and economic arrangements typical among dancers, 
overlapping in substance. Id. 
89. See Hanson, 754 P.2d at 446, quoting LARSON, supra note 61, §44.00. The United States 
Supreme Court recited the common law factors in greater detail in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), holding that the common law test applies in construing the 
definition of "employee" in ERISA claims. See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 
(1958) (identifying ten factors to be evaluated in distinguishing an employee from an 
independent contractor). 
90. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 43.52. 
91. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 43.51. The test for employee status applied in 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act claims, the "economic reality" test should be distinguished 
as yet another standard. See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987). 
92. Hanson, 754 P.2d at 447; Cy Investment, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, 876 P.2d 805 (Or. 1993). 
Winter 1999] MILLION DOLLARS AND AN APOLOGY 209 
customers and owners in strip clubs. Fundamentally, the club guarantees 
the presence of dancers on the premises, while creating the appearance that 
the women are freely interacting with the patrons on their own initiative, 
whether on stage or off. As between the dancers and the clubs, a 
combination of zero or minimal wages, ad hoc scheduling and strong club 
rules and incentives promoting customer access to the dancers is the 
norm. 93 Under these ambiguous arrangements, club owners enjoy obvious 
benefits and power over dancers as a group. Because women's pay is 
dependent on customer tips, without meaningful club regulation of 
customer behavior, dancers may feel that the non-regulation of their shifts 
and performances by club management is their only remaining leverage for 
negotiating relative safety under bad working conditions, including abusive 
customers. Without fixed schedules and performance requirements, 
dancers may be able to refuse shifts, types of performances and contact 
with certain customers who are especially abusive. 94 However, these 
arrangements turn the usual independent contractor/employee distinction 
inside out-neither the dancers nor the club owners control either the 
process or the result of the dancers' efforts. Ultimately, it is the customer 
who exercises the "right to control" dancers' performances and pay. It is 
this right of control over women that the club owners are selling as the 
entertainment. And, it is customers' inclinations that the dancers must 
93. Cases examining alleged federal wages and hours violations offer additional examples of 
the weak/strong model I am suggesting here. In Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d 
324 (5th Cir. 1993), dancers at the lipstick and Crazy Horse Saloon were paid only in tips from 
customers, and in fact had to pay a nightly $20 "tip-out" to the club to perform on the club stage. 
The club enforced customer access, both by tip rules, and by enforcing scheduling, tardiness and 
customer "mingling" times. Costume standards and final say on music selections were the only 
performance-specific rules imposed by the management on the dancers. Id. at 327. Dancers 
working under similar conditions at the Heavenly Bodies club, sued for minimum wage 
violations in Reich v. ABClYork-Estes Corp., 157 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. TIL 1994). The dancers paid 
a larger nightly "tip-out" of $50--$60 and the club specified dance movement and table dance 
procedures. Id. at 679. At the Cabaret Royale, sued in Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586 
(N.D. Tex. 1995) for similar minimum wage violations, dancers only had to sign in on a shift 
schedule, had no dance rotation shifts, and were not explicitly required to interact with 
customers. Nor were dancers required to have prior dance experience or conform their dances 
to any performance standards. They received no wages and the club acknowledged that "the 
ability to engage in conversation with club patrons and develop continuing relationships could 
increase an entertainer's revenue." Id. at 591. 
94. One dancer states: "I directed my lighting and music if I chose to dance on stage at all; 
decided whether, when, and for whom to perform personal dances; took breaks as I saw fit; and 
even danced barefoot when I liked." Stacy Reed, All Stripped Off, in WHORES AND OrHER 
FEMINISTS, supra note 10, at 179-80. However, the same author, describes the following 
working conditions as typical: 
Strippers in Texas make $20 for three minutes of undulation. A half hour of 
seductive behavior and two taxing deadbeats could precede that money. 
Four-inch heels ruin the back and feet. Few clubs offer health insurance. 
Every several weeks the drunken asshole turns up. Other strippers, DJs, and 
managers can all drain a dancer. Suffocating smoke and blaring music are 
no picnic either. 
Id. at 186. 
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satisfy, to get paid at all. 
This displacement of the right to control, from the club owners onto the 
customers, helps explain the confusion evident in judicial treatment of the 
issue in the context of stripping. In Cy Investment, the Oregon appellate 
court reviewed an agency determination that twenty-two dancers at Cy's 
Parkrose Pub were not "workers" under the "right of control" test. 95 Facts 
concerning the pub's method of hiring dancers, scheduling and payment 
practices, and supervision of performances were uncontested. Women who 
successfully auditioned at the pub could sign up for shifts on a weekly 
schedule. Many of the women performed at other clubs, with half using 
"agents" to obtain bookings.96 Dancers were paid a fee for every shift 
worked, averaging $6.00 an hour. In addition to these wages, dancers 
earned "substantial tips, which exceeded their wages.,,97 The dancers 
signed a form contract at the end of each shift, indicating the hours of each 
woman's shift and compensation received. The form also indicated that the 
dancer was responsible for her own taxes and workers' compensation; the 
dancers generally reported their earnings on Schedule C forms, deducting 
as business expenses the cost of costumes, tanning and professional 
grooming. 98 Cy's reported the compensation paid to the dancers to the IRS 
on Form 1099s, as "non-employee compensation." Supervision of dancing 
performances was limited to regulation of time spent on and off stage; 
dancers provided their own costumes and music. Fines were imposed for: 
"failing to confirm their scheduled appearances, tardiness, failing to 
complete their shift, and touching the mirrors on the stage.,,99 
Similar arrangements were the norm in Hanson. loo In testimony before 
the state Industrial Commission, the owner of the Hide-Out Saloon and 
Patrice Hanson's husband detailed the work arrangements between the 
Hide-Out and the dancers who worked there. As in Cy Investment, Hanson 
had no written employment contract. Scheduling was likewise relatively 
ad hoc, although there was conflicting testimony on the point. Hanson's 
husband testified that Patrice Hanson danced three to five nights per week, 
95. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 806. 
96. Id. I put "agents" in quotation marks because I am less convinced than the court 
evidently was that these persons functioned as ordinary entertainment agents. Lisa Sanchez 
recounts this exchange between a dancer and herself on the subject of agents: 
Heidi: ... I've been through many of 'em [agents] that, "OK, well, if you do 
this or this, I'll give you this shift." They would sit there and bribe the girls 
for money shifts. 
L.S.: What did they want from you? 
Heidi: Oh, just blow jobs, you know, just under the desk. Take 'em home, 
whatever. It's a sex business. That's all there is to it. 
Sanchez, supra note 14, at 567. 
97. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 806. 
98. Id. at 806. 
99. /d. 
100. Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444,445 (Idaho, 1988). 
it 
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at the owner's discretion. The owner testified that the dancers scheduled 
themselves on a sign-up calendar, and that Patrice Hanson often came in 
later than the 4:00 p.m. starting time and left before the I :00 a.m. quitting 
time. As in Cy Investment, dancers had to supply their own costumes; 
although in Hanson, the bar provided the music. The Hide-Out paid less 
than a minimum wage. Hanson's pay, and that of the other dancers, was a 
split of the cover charges (divided solely and equally among the dancers), 
the tips each woman received from customers and one free drink a night. 
With respect to the first, second and fourth "right to control" factors, 
the Cy Investment court reached ambiguous results. Analyzing the first 
"right of control" factor, control over the method of performance, the court 
found the facts divided. The pub evidently exercised some right of control. 
The employer defined the lengths of the dancers' shifts and fined the 
dancers for violating shop rules. On the other hand, because the dancers 
scheduled themselves, the employer did not control when or how 
frequently the dancers worked. In addition, the court considered relevant 
the facts that the employer did not restrict the dancers from working at 
other clubs, nor did the employer specify the dancers' costumes, music or 
dance routines. The court likewise found the second factor, the "method of 
payment," ambiguous. Tax behavior by both employer and employees 
suggest that parties viewed the arrangement as employer/independent 
contractor. However, the fee structure could suggest an hourly rate rather 
than a full shift, per-performance payment. WI The fourth factor, the "right 
to fire" factor, likewise tipped uncertainly between facts suggesting 
employment and those suggesting independent contractor status. On the 
one hand, Cy's had never terminated a dancer mid-shift, and never 
cancelled a previously scheduled shift. However, Cy's could, and did, 
retain the right not to invite a woman to sign on to the next weekly 
schedule, effectively exercising a right to fire given the brief duration of the 
period of contracted work. 102 
However, these facts take on a somewhat different significance if 
analyzed in the context of customer-dancer interaction. As I suggested 
earlier, the ambiguities the Cy Investment court discern track a sale of 
control over the dancers, from the club to the customer. The club's 
minimal scheduling and loosely imposed hire-and-fire practices meet the 
basic requirement of doing business as a strip club-ensuring that some 
women will be present and available for full shifts to keep the customers 
there all night. It is this access that the club is selling to the customer. 
Once the women are placed in front of the customers, the customers, not 
the club or the dancers, determine what demands the women must meet. 
This arrangement is structured via the method of payment: while the club 
101. See Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 807. 
102. Id. at 808. 
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pays the women a shift fee, tips from customers represent the women's 
primary income. 103 As Lisa Sanchez explains, 
women were encouraged by club management and coaxed with 
their only source of income-their tips-to engage in illegal 
activities, but they were expected to assume all of the risk of those 
activities. . .. [H]abitual violations of rules, illegal touching, and 
egregious cases of sexual harassment ... [are] a routine part of 
strip-industry culture. 104 
The Cy Investment court's analysis of the "right of control" factors shields 
the customer's control from sight, thereby distorting these dynamics 
beyond recognition. By this move, the court allocates to the dancer the 
autonomy and control actually exercised over her by the customer, while 
also compromising her right of recovery against the club owner. 
For me, the courts' treatment of the third "right of control" factor raises 
the most poignant issues. The third factor asks who furnishes the 
equipment used for the job. It was the equipment factor that was contested 
on appeal in Hanson,105 but was the one factor that the Cy Investment court 
weighed unambiguously in favor of independent contractor status. 106 Nor 
did the courts agree what the relevant equipment is, for the purpose of 
evaluating this factor. However, both courts evaded the key issue of what 
the job of stripping is, and consequently could not address the equipment 
question squarely. 
Patrice Hanson's body was the item of "equipment" analyzed 
Hanson-both the Industrial Commission and a dissenting judge on appeal 
treated her as worker-supplied "equipment.,,107 The equipment is an 
"exotic dancer's body when she is engaged in her dancing before the 
patrons of a saloon.,,108 However, the majority of the appellate court 
rejected this classification. 109 The court reasoned that because in cases 
involving personal services, both employees and independent contractors 
103. The arrangement in Hanson with respect to these factors was similar: minimal employer 
involvement in shift compliance; performance demands enforced by the customers; all forms of 
payment (cover charges and tips) fixed by immediate customer satisfaction. Hanson, 754 P.2d 
at 445. Unsurprisingly, the Industrial Commission found that all of these factors weighed in 
favor of independent contractor status. Id. See also supra note 93. 
104. Sanchez, supra note 14, at 566. 
105. The appellate court did not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
commission's conclusions respecting the other three factors. As to the first factor, the 
commission found that the saloon "did not assume the right to exercise direction over the time, 
manner, method and details of work performed by deceased." Hanson, 754 P.2d at 445. As to 
the second, the commission stated that "the dancers chose their own days and hours of work." 
/d. Finally, as to the fourth factor, "the method of pay was consistent with that of an 
independent contractor." Id. 
106. See Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 808. 
107. Hanson, 754 P.2d at 447. 
108. Id. at 448 (McFadden, 1., dissenting). 
109. Id. at 447. 
t'W.'61* E* ,s. 
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typically supply the body doing the work, the test must refer to equipment 
of a different kind. 11O The court treated the dancer's use of her body as 
equivalent to the uses to which a carpenter's arm or mail carrier's legs are 
put. The sort of equipment to which the test properly refers, the court 
stated, "include such things as tools, machinery, special clothing, parts and 
other similar items necessary for the worker to accomplish the task to be 
performed," not the worker's body. III 
In contrast, the Cy Investment court did not address the status of the 
dancers' bodies as equipment. The items of equipment under scrutiny there 
only included the dancers' costumes, the music and the stage. The dancers 
provided their own costumes and music (or paid Cy's for the use of its 
jukebox).112 The equipment arguably provided by the employer (the stage) 
was not viewed as equipment at all, but simply as the "site" of the 
performance. l13 On these facts, the trial court held that the dancers were 
not workers. 114 
Neither court's analysis is compelling. In Hanson, the court denies the 
basic unavoidable bottom line about stripping and nude dancing that, unlike 
the use of the body in carpentry or mail delivery, the woman's sexualized 
body is the commodity and access to her body the service. By not honestly 
confronting how women's bodies are actually used as entertainment 
commodities in strip clubs, the Hanson court normalizes stripping as a 
regular job in an apparent effort to support the dignity of the women 
performers. In Cy Investment, the court addresses the "equipment" status 
of the props and trappings of the women's dancing performances-the 
costumes, the music, and the stage-again without addressing the extent to 
which the job itself has to do with dancing at all. In short, both courts 
address the equipment question, without ever engaging directly in the 
question of what job the equipment is used to perform. 
Throughout this discussion, I have addressed the legal standards used 
in workers' compensation systems to define job-relatedness and employee 
status as applied to prostitution and stripping. These legal standards not 
only inadequately capture the experience of the women involved, but also 
undermine the ability of women to recover compensation. Another, more 
appropriate source of public benefits for women in sex industries, may be 
disability programs. These programs do not require proof of a connection 
between a person's benefits claim and an employment relationship. I now 




112. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 808. 
113. /d. 
114. Id. 
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II. SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAMS 
The important role of SSI benefits in the lives of women reslstmg 
prostitution is well known, at least anecdotally. So too, is the impact of 
benefit cuts in pushing women into the practice. As one woman explained 
after becoming homeless when dropped from the SSI disability progam 
during the Reagan administration's notorious eligibility review, "I tried 
prostitution .... I never in the world would have thought about doing 
anything like that under normal circumstances. But, I mean, what else 
could I do? Welfare's not there for me anymore.,,115 Under the current 
federal program, benefits are available for persons who are disabled, aged 
or blind and are intended to guarantee a minimum income level. 116 Unlike 
worker's compensation plans, SSI benefit eligibility is predicated directly 
on the existence of a disabling condition, without regard to the cause of the 
impairment or the employment status of the disabled person. The key 
eligibility provision in the statute defines "disability" as: 
[I]inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months. 117 
Disabling conditions, which meet the statutory standards and which are 
common among women in prostitution, include depression-related 
impairments, 118 anxiety disorders,119 problems with concentration 
associated with anxiety,120 organ damage from beatingsl21 and foot and 
back injury from dancing. 122 A significant restriction on the scope of 
115. See ROB ROSENTHAL, HOMELESS IN PARADISE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN 64 (1994). 
116. "The basic purpose underlying the supplemental security program is to assure a 
minimum level of income for persons who are 65 or over, or who are blind or disabled and who 
do not have sufficient resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal 
minimum income level." 20 c.F.R. § 416.110 (1998). 
117. 42 U.S.c. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West 1994). 
118. See, e.g., Woody v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 
1988) (uncontested evidence that claimant had become unable to do anything for himself, was 
in a reactive depression and was totally disabled, justified setting aside AU's denial of benefits). 
119. See, e.g., Marcotte v. Callahan, 992 F. Supp. 485 (D.N.H. 1997) (anxiety disorder 
limiting claimant's tolerance in dealing with the public). 
120. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Callahan, 9 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Mass. 1998) (seems to indicate 
functional limitations due to anxiety or depression, difficulty maintaining concentration and 
attention, understanding and remembering detailed instructions and other mental demands may 
rise to the level of disability). 
121. See, e.g., Kelly v. Celebrezze, 220 F. Supp. 611 (W.D.S.C. 1963) (dysfunction of the 
limbs or other organs of the body). 
122. See, e.g., Lopez Diaz v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 585 F.2d 1137, 
1141 (1st Cir. 1978) (ankle synovitis and calcaneal spurs, rendering employee unable to travel to 
and from a workplace, relevant to disability determination); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 
837 (8th Cir. 1983) (ankle injury and resultant pain); Brown v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 447,449 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (back pain in lower back). 
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compensable impairments was enacted in 1994, which excluded 
impairments to which alcoholism or drug addiction would be a 
"contributing factor material to [agency] determination that the individual 
is disabled.,,123 Despite the alcoholism and addiction exclusion, SSI 
benefits should be pursued on behalf of women with histories in 
prostitution-especially in light of the severe post-traumatic stress disorder 
symptoms that often affect women's recovery and employment paths. 
A basic issue affecting the availability of SSI benefits for women in 
prostitution is whether prostitution or stripping may be considered a source 
of income thus barring eligibility for disability benefits. By statute, a 
disability claimant must be denied benefits if the claimant is working and 
engaging in "substantial gainful activity.,,124 If the claimant is so engaged, 
her claim is rejected without regard to her medical condition. 125 Here 
again, the question of whether prostitution is work reenters the discussion, 
this time as the determinative factor in determining whether a disability is 
provable. In contrast to the workers' compensation programs, the statute 
and current case law apparently endorse the status of prostitution as a job. 
These rules effectively bar disability benefits claims for women in 
prostitution and force women back to prostitution for their sole source of 
income. 
This result has been reached in two doctrinal steps. The first step was 
the determination that illegal transactions can be properly considered 
substantial gainful activity under the law. This issue was first entertained 
by the courts without explicit guidance from Congress or agency 
regulation. In the early 1990s, a series of district court and appellate court 
cases involving claimants engaged in drug dealing, thievery or prostitution, 
held that income-generating activity need not be lawful to constitute 
substantial gainful activity. The fact that the claimant's work activity is 
illegal is irrelevant to the disability determination. 126 In reaching this 
conclusion, the courts stressed the unfairness that would result if illegally-
obtained earnings were ignored in disability determinations. In one case 
involving a claimant's drug dealing, the court explained: 
123. 42 U.S.c. §§ 423(d)(2)(C) (West 1996). For analysis of the constitutionality and 
congressional intent of this amendment, see Stengel v. Callahan, 983 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. TIL 
1997). See also Linda G. Mills & Anthony Atjo, Disability Benefits, Substance Addiction, and 
the Undeserving Poor: A Critique of the Social Security Independence and Program 
Improvement Act of 1994,3 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 125 (1996). 
124. 42 U.S.c.§ 423(e)(1) (West 1998) ("No benefit shall be payable ... to an individual for 
any month ... in which he engages in substantial gainful activity .... "). 
125. 20 c.F.R. § 416.920(a) (West 1998) ("If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we 
will determine that you are not disabled."). See id. § 416.920(b) (1998) ("If you are working 
and the work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled 
regardless of your medical condition or your age, education, and work experience."). 
126. See Mooney v. Shalala, 889 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.H. 1994) (drug dealing constitutes 
substantial gainful activity). 
/ill 
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The term 'gainful activity' could be thought to imply lawful work, 
for it would be incongruous to describe even a very prosperous 
thief as "gainfully employed." But there would be an even greater 
incongruity in disregarding earnings from criminal activity. For 
then as between two people earning the same amount of money, 
one legally and the other illegally, the former would be disentitled 
to seek social security disability benefits and the latter would be 
entitled to seek them. The thief would be qualified, the honest man 
disqualified. 127 
In 1994, Congress amended the Social Security Act to be consistent 
with this line of cases by affirming that the legality or illegality of the 
activities generating income for the claimant was irrelevant to the question 
of whether the activities constitute substantial work activity.128 Thus, it 
seems clear that the fact that prostitution is illegal will be no bar to 
disallowing benefits to a woman who, in the factfinder's opinion, is 
engaged in "substantial gainful activity" by prostitution. 
The second doctrinal step was determining whether prostitution falls 
within the statutory definition of substantial gainful activity. By regulation, 
substantial gainful activity has been defined as "work activity that is both 
substantial and gainful.,,129 These elements can be proven by either a 
factual application of a two-prong test, or by a presumption based on 
monthly income. Under the first element of the two-prong test, work 
activity is substantial if it "involves doing significant physical or mental 
activities." 130 Here, the factfinder considers the nature of the tasks 
comprising the claimant's work activity. The relevant inquiry is the extent 
127. Bell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1996), quoting 
Jones v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 191, 192 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571 (7th 
Cir. 1993). The statutory inclusion of illegal activities in the definition of substantial gainful 
activity did not apply in Ms. Bell's case because she filed her claim prior to the effective date of 
the new provision. However, The 1994 amendment reflects a congressional position congruent 
with the rationale expressed in Jones and reaffirmed in Bell. 
128. 1994 U.S.CCA.N. (l08 Stat.) 1464, 1499 (amending 42 U.S.C § 423(d)(4)). This 
amendment approved a line of cases holding to the same effect, involving disability claims by 
persons involved in drug dealing, thievery or prostitution. See Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571 
(7th Cir. 1993) (theivery); Jones v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 191 (7th Cir. 1994) (petty theft); Corrao v. 
Shalala, 20 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (drug dealing); Bell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 
105 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1996) (prostitution); Hardaway v. Arpel, No. 96-56594, 1998 WL 19540 
(9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) (drug dealing); Mooney v. Shalala, 889 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.H. 1994) 
(drug dealing constitutes substantial gainful activity); Speaks v. Sec'y of Health and Human 
Services, 855 F. Supp. 1108 (CD. Cal. 1994) (prostitution); Bell v. Sullivan, 817 F. Supp. 719 
(N.D. TIL 1993); Jones v. Sullivan, 804 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. TIL 1992); Dugan v. Bowen, No. 
87-3713, 1989 WL 281911 (S.D. TIL Nov. 8, 1989) (unpublished), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom; Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Hart v. Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 903 
(N.D. Cal. 1992); Moore v. Sullivan, 1992 WL 199257 (N.D. TIl. Aug 4, 1992) (unpublished). 
Cf Hammonds v. Celebrezze, 260 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ala. 1965) (claimant's illegal 
manufacture of whiskey not conclusive evidence of SGA absent evidence of earnings). 
129. 20 CF.R. § § 416.972, 416.910. 
130. Id. at § 416.972 (a) (defining "substantial work activity"). 
Mt 
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to which the activity requires the use of "expertise, skills, supervision, and 
responsibilities." 131 In applying this test, the legal status of the claimant's 
activities may bear indirectly on the substantiality analysis. As the court in 
Corrao v. Shalala concluded, some practices involved in drug dealing may 
fail to meet the substantiality test where the claimant's activities offer "no 
indication of initiative, organization, responsibility, or physical or mental 
exertion.,,132 Under the second, "gainfulness" prong of the test, work 
activity is gainful if it "is the kind of work usually done for payor 
profit." 133 In any case, income over $500 per month creates a rebuttable 
presumption of substantial gainful activity. 134 Thus, if prostitution is 
considered a substantial gainful activity, either under the two-prong test or 
presumptively, claimants may be denied the means to escape the 
prostitution-the prostitution that is likely the cause of the alleged 
disability in the first place. 
There is case law which so holds, relying primarily on income 
presumption as the determinative method of proof. In Bell v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, the Sixth Circuit denied Melinda Bell's 
SSI claim alleging disability due to chronic cocaine and alcohol 
dependence. 135 The court cited evidence that the claimant earned over 
$500 a month from prostitution. In Love v. Sullivan, Cynthia Love was 
denied both SSI and SSDI benefits because she was engaged in substantial 
gainful activity as a prostitute, earning between forty-five and eighty 
dollars a day.136 Finally, in Speaks v. Secretary of Health and Human 
131. Id. at § 416.973(a). See also id. at § 416.973(b). Work that is performed 
inadequately or that is "make-work" is not considered substantial gainful activity: 
If you do your work satisfactorily, this may show that you are working at the 
substantial gainful activity level. If you are unable, because of your 
impairments, to do ordinary or simple tasks satisfactorily without more 
supervision or assistance than is usually given to other people doing similar 
work, this may show that you are not working at the substantial gainful 
activity level. If you are doing work that involves minimal duties that make 
little or no demands on you and that are of little or no use to your employer, 
or to the operation of a business if you are self-employed, this does not show 
that you are working at the substantial gainful activity level. 
Id. at § 416.973(b). 
132. Carrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943,949 (9th Cir. 1994). The court based this conclusion on 
the grounds that Corrao's activities, as a go-between between dealers and buyers in return for 
drugs, occupied less than an hour a day, most of which was spent riding as a passenger in a car. 
Further, Corrao's activities "did not require any significant mental or physical exertion," and he 
"did no planning," "did not use his own money for the transactions" and received his payment in 
drugs. In addition, the court differentiated Corrao's activities from "traditional employment" or 
from pursuing a "sole proprietorship." Id. 
133. See 20 c.F.R. § 416.972(b)( 1998) (defining "gainful work activity"). 
134. Id. at § 416.974 (b)(2)(vii) ($500 in monthly earnings will ordinarily show that the 
claimant has been engaged in substantial gainful activity). See also Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 
1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1992). 
135. See Bell v. Commissoner of Socail Security, 105 F.3d 244, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1996). 
136. Love v. Sullivan, No. 91C7863, 1992 WL 86193 at *3 (N.D. TIL April 22, 1992) (The 
focus of the court's analysis in Love was on the significance, if any, to be placed on the legal! 
------,--~-----
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Services, claimant Veda Speaks was denied disability benefits on the 
ground that she had been making at least $600 a month for over twenty 
years in the practice of prostitution. 137 
In Speaks and Bell, the courts further evaluated whether the income 
presumption had or could have been rebutted by other factors. The relevant 
statute is silent on what factual showing rebuts the income presumption. In 
Bell, the claimant offered proof that her prostitution was "symptomatic of a 
serious mental disorder and ... was driven by her drug addiction.,,138 The 
court deemed these considerations irrelevant to the disability determination. 
The claimant's proffer, the court explained, confused the fact of the 
claimant's earnings with the question of what motivated her. The court 
reasoned that only the fact of the claimant's earning power is of interest 
under the statute. "The case law is clear that it does not matter what 
motivates plaintiff to earn income from illegal prostitution.,,139 Similarly, 
in Speaks, the magistrate treated as rebuttable only those factors relevant to 
the determination of whether the claimant's activities were substantial and 
gainful. The magistrate concluded that prostitution is "real world 
employment" thereby satisfying the substantial-and-gainful test. The court 
distinguished this case from Corrao, in which intermittent and passive 
drug-dealing activities were found insubstantial. I4o The Speaks magistrate 
went further and rejected as legally irrelevant the claimant's assertion that 
she was mentally and physically incapable of performing any other work 
than prostitution. 141 
The results in these cases are wrong. As the Speaks magistrate bluntly 
pointed out, "the Secretary's denial of plaintiff's claim for SSI-without 
deciding that the plaintiff is capable of any other activity-is tantamount to 
telling her that it is expected that in the future she will earn her living 
through prostitution.,,142 This result is wrong, first, because it amounts to 
state-sponsored pimping. Second, it is wrong because by failing to 
examine whether in fact a claimant's prostitution activities were 
"substantial," these holdings are doctrinally incomplete. Tracy Clements, 
in her thorough examination of these cases, faults the Speaks opinion in 
particular for ignoring the evidence that might have rebutted the relied 
illegal activity distinction. As other courts of the period held, the Love court concluded that 
"[t]he illegality of her occupation does not negate the fact that Love has a substantial source of 
income."). 
137. See Speaks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 855 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (CD. Cal. 
1994). 
138. Bell, 105 F.3d at 246--47. 
139. Id. at 247 (citing Corrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943,947 (9th Cir. 1994), for the proposition 
that an addict who is able to function in society, albeit illegally, indicates that she is not disabled 
for SST purposes). 
140. Speaks, 855 F. Supp. at 1113. See supra note 132 for a summary of the Corrao facts. 
141. Speaks, 855 F. Supp. at 1113. 
142. /d. at 1111. 
• 
Winter 1999] MILLION DOLLARS AND AN APOLOGY 219 
upon income presumption. 143 
These are already significant cntIcisms, but it is the third error in 
reasoning that I find most disturbing. Suppose that these were claims 
brought by combat survivors whose disabilities included post-traumatic 
stress disorder and physical impairments. It would, I believe, be 
unthinkable for an administrative law judge to deny the soldiers' benefits 
claims on grounds that they had earned more than $500 a month while on 
active duty (and implying that the answer for them is to re-enlist). 
Likewise here, the very activities tacitly treated as "substantial" in these 
opinions are the circumstances causing the claimed disabling condition. 
Even worse, the symptoms of disabling post-traumatic stress, experienced 
by prostituted women, which include dissociative illness, insomnia, 
profound depression and anxiety, are emotional states that enable women to 
continue to function-albeit self-destructively-in the sex industry. The 
more a woman shuts down, numbs herself and the more traumatized she is, 
the more she may feel she can take one more day of it. On the logic of the 
Speaks opinion, the SSI program not only refuses disability benefits to 
prostituted women, the program professionalizes disability. 
III. BEYOND THE WORK-DISABILITY DICHOTOMY: TOWARD PUBLIC 
BENEFITS FOR SEX -BASED TRAUMA. 
As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, whether prostitution is 
viewed as a job or as a disabling condition, prostituted women's legal 
entitlements to public benefits are deeply compromised in either case. A 
more promising, third alternative may be found in an unlikely text: the 
1996 federal welfare reform bill.l44 I refer to that document as an unlikely 
source of support for women's needs since the measures mandated by the 
statute eliminate, destabilize and reduce federal benefits for poor mothers 
generally. 145 However, one provision of that bill, dubbed the Family 
Violence Option, authorizes state recipients of federal welfare block grants 
to waive durational and other restrictions on benefit eligibility for certain 
domestic violence victims. Waivers may be extended if the recipient can 
demonstrate first, a history of domestic violence, and second, that 
143. Clements, supra note 6, at 79. Clements observes: 
[d. 
[T]he court made no reference to how often Speaks solicits or engages in 
prostitution, how much she is paid for each service provided, whether her 
activities require a substantial investment of time, or to what degree her 
activities are physically exerting. 
144. Pub. L. No. 104--193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7, 29, 42 U.S.c.). 
145. The new law mandates a sixty month, lifetime cap on receipt of benefits. See Personal 
Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.c. § 608(a)(7)(A) (West 1997) (federal block grants for state-
designed welfare programs). See also id. at § 603(a)(7)(A) (explicitly declares that no 
individual is entitled to assistance under any state program funded by these federal block 
grants) . 
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compliance with ordinary restrictions would "make it more difficult for 
individuals receiving assistance ... to escape domestic violence or unfairly 
penalize such individuals who are or have been victimized by such 
violence, or individuals who are at risk of further domestic violence.,,146 
The statute defines domestic violence as "battered or subjected to extreme 
cruelty," which is defined as: 
(I) physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in, physical 
injury to the individual; 
(II) sexual abuse; 
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child; 
(IV) being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child to 
engage in nonconsensual sex acts or activities; 
(V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse; 
(VI) mental abuse; or 
(VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care. 147 
These provisions were enacted in response to feminist lobbying on behalf 
of battered women-backed up with research evidence that domestic 
violence is a significant barrier to many women seeking education and 
employment. 148 
146. Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 103, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105, 2112 (amending 42 
V.S.c. 601 et seq.). A related provision, dubbed the Hardship Exception, authorizes states 
to exempt recipients from duration limits "by reason of hardship or if the family includes an 
individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty." 42 US.c. § 
608(a)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1997). The statute permits only a limited number of waivers to 
be granted under the Hardship Exemption. Id. at § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii). Whether the same 
restriction, or others, apply with respect to waivers granted under the Family Violence 
Option is in some doubt. See Jennifer M. Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic 
Violence: A Proposal for Implementing an Exception to Welfare Time Limits, 73 N.Y.U L. 
REv. 621, 634-37 (1997). For analysis of the needs of domestic violence victims, and 
policy implications of meeting those needs in welfare legislation, see Jady Raphael, 
Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare 
Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201 (1996). 
147. Personal Responsibility Act, 42 US.c. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii). 
148. The Family Violence Option provision was drafted by Martha Davis, Legal Director of 
the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Joan Meier, Professor at George Washington 
School of Law. See Felicia Kornbluh, Feminists and the Welfare Debate: Too Little? Too 
Late?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov.lDee. 1996, at 24, 39. For a review of research findings 
supporting domestic violence waivers, see Jady Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare 
Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 
201 (1996). See also Mason, supra note 146, at 638-52; Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and 
Safety: Welfare Reforms for Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3 
(1997); Jady Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: The Unexplored Barrier to 
" 
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Federal and state support for the Family Violence Option offers hope to 
prostituted women on several levels. First, on its face the statutory waiver 
option should already be available to women who have been prostituted or 
have otherwise been used in the sex industry, and who meet the other 
eligibility criteria for receipt of benefits. 149 The conditions defining 
"extreme cruelty" under the statute clearly track the routine intimidation, 
coercion and abuse suffered by prostituted women-abuse that is often 
inflicted routinely during the important developmental stages in a young 
woman's life. 150 Second, federal policy choices, favoring the maintenance 
of the social safety net, at least for victims of sexual and physical violence, 
could and should represent the beginnings of an economic and medical 
recovery program tailored to the needs of sexual trauma survivors. Among 
sexual trauma survivors, prostituted women are among the most deeply 
affected. 
The 1996 Family Violence Option is only one example of such 
supportive intervention. Congressional and agency endorsement of federal 
policy measures favoring continued welfare support for sexually victimized 
women continues to build. 151 These initiatives link government policy 
support for battered women's receipt of public benefits with the 
commitments underlying existing federal criminal sanctions and civil rights 
remedies extended to victims of gender-based violence under the Violence 
Against Women ACt. 1S2 As Jennifer Mason points out, taken together, 
Employment, 3 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 29 (1995). 
149. The most significant criteria are indigency and caretaking responsibility for a minor 
child. Many prostituted women meet these criteria. 
150. Patricia Murphy reports that domestic violence is especially injurious to young women 
between the ages of 13 and 26, when young women should be building job skills and 
developing a work identity. See PATRICIA A. MuRPHY, MAKING THE CONNECTIONS: WOMEN, 
WORK AND ABUSE 191 (1994). 
151. The authors of the Family Violence Option in the Senate, Paul Wellstone and Patty 
Murray, introduced new legislation last year expressing affirmative congressional support 
for the adoption of state waivers, and harmonizing the Family Violence Option with the 
Hardship Exemption, providing that no numerical cap be imposed on the waivers authorized 
under the Family Violence Option and that recipients so waived not be counted in 
determining state compliance with work participation rates. See A Bill To Clarify The 
Family Violence Option Under The Temporary Assistance To Needy Families Program, S. 
671, 105th Congo § 1(1) (1997) (expressing congressional intent in enacting Personal 
Responsibility Act); Id. at § 2(a) (proposed amendment to the Personal Responsibility Act, 
42 US.c. § 602(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997)). 
The Department of Health and Human Services proposed a new rule in November, 1997 
waiving penalties against states for failure to achieve work participation rates or exceeding the 
federal cap on exceptions where these defaults are attributable to waivers based on domestic 
violence. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (T ANF) Proposed Rule, 62 
Fed. Reg. 62,124 (1997) (to be codified at 45 c.F.R. pt. 270---275) (proposed Nov. 20, 1997). 
These initiatives are explained in detail in Mason, supra note 146, at 634--37. 
152. See 18 US.c. §§ 2261-2262 (1994) (creating criminal penalties for crossing state lines 
with intent to injure or intimidate a spouse or intimate partner, or to violate an order of 
protection). See also 42 US.c. § 3796 (West 1994) (creating a civil cause of action for 
remedies for violations of right to be free from gender motivated violence). 
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these measures "indicate[] that Congress believes that survivors of 
domestic violence have a compelling claim on federal resources, and 
further suggest[] that Congress wants to encourage states to expend their 
resources to aid survivors of domestic violence.,,153 The next advocacy 
step-public benefits for trauma recovery itself-seems both obvious and 
practicable on the existing political landscape. 
Moving toward a model of public benefits for trauma recovery also 
removes the case of prostitution from the no-win, work-or-disability 
debate, which freezes women out from eligibility under both benefit 
programs. By anchoring eligibility criteria in women's trauma recovery 
needs, women's experience of prostitution emerges as a traumatic event, no 
longer remaining buried under a pile of hush money that labels sexual 
exploitation as "work" or "substantial gainful activity." An immediate, 
additional step furthering this acknowledgement process would be to 
amend existing definitions of "work activity" in current state welfare laws. 
These definitions fix the rules for mandatory work participation required of 
welfare recipients for continued receipt of benefits. 154 States should enact 
exclusion provisions, explicitly excluding prostitution, stripping and any 
other legal or illegal sexual entertainment from the definition of "work" or 
"employment" for this statutory purpose. For example, such a provision 
would bar welfare caseworkers from requiring a woman to take a job at a 
strip club as a condition for receiving benefits. 155 Prohibiting state 
mandated sex work in this way is also consistent with commitment to the 
principle that no woman be required to participate in prostitution or other 
sex industry practices in an egalitarian, inclusive society. 
In offering these proposals, I am sadly mindful of the vicious attacks 
made on single, young mothers in the course of the last rounds of welfare 
"reform" in the mid-1990s. These attacks fed on the same stereotypes that 
153. Mason, supra note 146, at 637. 
154. For example, the definition of "work activity" in the Florida law, now called the "Work 
and Gain Economic Self-sufficiency (WAGES) Act," refers generally to "full-time or part-time 
employment" in the private sector that may be mandated of welfare recipients. See FLA. STAT. 
ch. § 414.065(1)(a) (1998). No other definition of employment appears in the statute. Similar 
provisions appear in the new California and New York welfare-to-work statutes. See CAL. 
WELF. & INST. Code § 11322.6 (a-q) (West Supp. 1997); NEW YORK Soc. SERvo Law Title 9-B, 
§ 336 (McKinney 1997). A general non-discrimination clause is included in the work 
participation requirements in these statutes. The Florida version states that "[e]ach participant is 
subject to the same health, safety, and nondiscrimination standards established under federal, 
state, or loca1laws that otherwise apply to other individuals engaged in similar activities who are 
not participants in the WAGES program." FLA. STAT. § 414.065 (I1)(a). See CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 11322.62 (non-discrimination clause); NEW YORK Soc. SERvo Law § 331 (3), § 
336 (e-f). No substantive exclusions of categories of employment, as I suggest here, exist in the 
state statutes cited above. 
155. Nothing in this proposal should prevent an administrative agency or court from treating 
prostitution or sex work as an injurious practice for purposes of awarding Social Security or 
workers' compensation benefits. This proposal would only prohibit mandated sexual 
entertainment practices, imposed as a condition of welfare eligibility. 
BhS e- i' 
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have always stigmatized prostituted women: that women's destitution and 
sexual vulnerability can be explained away as products of bad choices or of 
the "culture of poverty" or as evidence of greedy character. If politicians 
and policymakers chose to abandon needy young mothers, and forfeit the 
needs of children for intimate parenting, what hope is there for the claims 
of prostituted women? 
I think that hope lies in the truths about our lives that women have the 
courage to tell, and in the willingness, however attention-deficit-disordered, 
of legal decisionmakers to hear those truths. The last moment that truth 
can be told about women, I think, is the moment just before she is 
dehumanized and turned into a thing, a stereotype and a pathology. In our 
society, that transforming moment occurs when a woman is beaten. That is 
the moment when she is no longer seen as a person, with dignity and 
personality. That is the moment before the abuser and the system swallow 
her self, her hopes, prospects, reason and feelings-she is placed outside 
the circle of human regard. That is the final moment when we can still see 
the woman, the girl, the human being-during and after which we see only 
the prostitute, the willing victim, the welfare dependent. A trauma-based 
public benefits program would tell the history of this moment-all that 
came before and all that comes after-on behalf of each woman, 
prostituted or not, seeking assistance. If I am right, histories so told could 
begin the process of re-humanizing women, all women, including the 
prostituted, the battered, the raped and the murdered. 
Retrieving women economically and mentally from the diaspora of 
sexual dehumanization is a political and civil obligation in any society that 
claims to extend full citizenship to women. 156 The full reintegration of 
156. This position is consistent with that taken in the Proposed Convention Against Sexual 
Exploitation, drafted principally by an expert working group convened by the Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women in collaboration with UNESCO (the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council). See BARRY, supra note 31, at 304-09 (detailing the drafting 
process and substantive guarantees contained in the proposal). Among the state obligations 
listed in the convention are: 
Article 12 
State Parties agree to take appropriate measures to provide: 
(a) Restitution to victims of sexual exploitation, and to insure that, 
notwithstanding the victims' immigration status, their reports of 
sexual exploitation receive a fair hearing. 
(b) Women with educational programs and work in order to increase 
women's economic opportunities and enhance women's worth and 
status, thereby diminishing the necessity for women to tum to 
prostitution, notwithstanding the victims' immigration status. 
Article 13 
State parties shall create and establish services for victims of sexual 
exploitation, including prostitution, such as shelters and other social 
services, and shall fund specialized health services and centers for 
prostitution alternatives that are voluntary and confidential and 
would provide the following: 
(a) Prevention, treatment of, and testing for STDs and HIV. 
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women into the life of their communities also constitutes a final stage of 
healing and recovery from traumatic experience for sufferers. 157 A publicly 
supported benefits program for trauma victims serves both of those aims: 
expressing deeply democratic political values in material and programmatic 
form and extending human acceptance and care that victims need for 
authentic participation in their own lives. As Judith Herman explains: 
Traumatic events destroy the sustaining bonds between individual 
and community. Those who have survived learn that their sense of 
self, of worth, of humanity, depends upon a feeling of connection 
to others. The solidarity of a group provides the strongest 
protection against terror and despair, and the strongest antidote to 
traumatic experience. Trauma isolates; the group recreates a sense 
of belonging. Trauma shames and stigmatizes; the group bears 
witness and affirms. Trauma degrades the victim; the group exalts 
her. Trauma dehumanizes the victim; the group restores her 
humanity. 158 
These are the first steps to the million dollars and the apology. We 
should take them. 
Id. at 332-33. 
(b) Substance-abuse rehabilitation programs. 
(c) Training of medical staff .... 
(d) Free and elective counseling and education services. 
(e) Child care facilities and housing assistance. 
(f) Income support. 
(g) Preferential access to credit and loans to begin small-
scale business. 
(h) Non-sexist skills training programs. 
157. HERMAN, supra note 28, at 214-36. 
158. Id. at 214. 
